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ABSTRACT 
This paper extends the concept of the resource curse by studying whether and through which 
transmission channels natural resource wealth affects social spending. Even though the availability of 
vast natural capital reserves has commonly been linked to the neglect of human development, most of 
the literature has continued to focus on economic performance. This paper is the first to empirically 
investigate the link between natural resource wealth and public health expenditures in light of the 
hypothesis that resource wealth as a source of unearned state income enhances state autonomy and 
increases volatility, which leads to policies that fail to prioritize human development. Using a large panel 
dataset of world countries covering the period from 1995 to 2009, we find a robust, significant inverse 
relationship between natural resource dependence, and even abundance, and public health spending 
over time. The effect remains significant after controlling for state autonomy, volatility, and other factors. 
These findings have implications for national authorities as well as the extractive industry. Governments 
should be made accountable for natural resource wealth and correct taxation could provide additional 
resources, earmarked for health. The extractive industry could increase their investments in sustainable 
Corporate Social Responsibility operations, specifically in the health sector. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The paradox of natural resource wealth has inspired innumerous studies and continues to fascinate 
researchers across disciplinary boundaries. Even though the availability of vast natural capital has 
commonly been linked to the neglect of human development and the deterioration of institutions, most of 
the literature has continued to focus on the implications of the abundance of or dependence on natural 
resources on growth or other measures of economic performance. This paper aims at extending the 
concept of the resource curse and obtaining additional insights into the impact of resource wealth on 
government priorities and accountability. In particular it will add to the literature by contributing empirical 
insights on the link between resource wealth and human capital building.  
The results of this research provide new input into the ongoing policy debate on innovative ways to 
channel natural resource revenues towards human development. This is particularly relevant as it has 
been observed that despite impressive growth accelerations in some resource-rich developing 
countries, human development indicators are still lagging behind. The World Bank (2013a) states that 
African countries that are experiencing strong economic growth from mineral revenues do not appear to 
have translated this wealth into improved health. Moreover, the 2013 African Progress Report notes that 
child malnutrition is endemic amongst African resource-rich countries and the levels of maternal 
mortality are well above average. Karl (2007) also mentions that despite significant rises in income, the 
living standards in oil-dependent countries have degraded over the past decades. Several scholars 
have established an adverse association between resource wealth and different health outcomes and 
the quality of health care provision. Take for example Angola, Sub-Saharan Africa’s second-largest 
exporter of oil and the world’s fifth-largest producer of diamonds, which is considered a “fragile state” 
(AFDB, 2009) and continuously performs well below regional averages with regards to health indicators. 
Even though the country has been making modest progress, the health system remains severely 
underdeveloped and while the rich enjoy highly subsidized private health care, the poor rural population 
lacks access to even the most rudimentary care (Africa Progress Panel, 2013). In order to tackle this 
perceived misalignment of resource wealth and human development and enable the population in 
resource-rich developing countries to truly profit from the opportunities provided by their vast natural 
resource endowments, it is important to investigate the intricate dynamics of the resource curse from a 
broader point of view. 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the resource curse literature by looking into the relationship 
between natural resource wealth and public health spending. There is an increasing consensus on the 
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importance of health as a driver of sustainable economic growth (Barro, 2000). Moreover, the growth 
promoting benefits from health have been argued to be especially important for poor countries 
(Bhargava et al., 2001). This seems to be reflected in the fact that on average public financing of health 
has risen sharply in developing countries and is expected to increase even further (Lu et al., 2010).  The 
lower health expenditures in resource-rich countries therefore represent an important missed 
opportunity to use natural resource wealth to secure long term economic prosperity. Moreover, the 
importance of public health expenditures goes beyond the mere economic consequences, as it entails 
wide-ranging social implications and can be crucial in alleviating poverty (Gupta et al., 2003).  
This paper focuses on inputs rather than health outcomes, as to grasp to what extent governments in 
resource-rich countries fail to prioritize policies geared towards the poor and human development. The 
results of this paper therefore also constitute a test for the hypothesized adverse effects of natural 
resources as a source of unearned state income that gives rise to autonomous and unaccountable 
states. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically explore the impact of resource wealth on 
public health expenditures over time. We use a large panel dataset of world countries covering the 
period from 1995 to 2009 constructed for the aim of this research.  
We find that both natural resource abundance and dependence are associated with lower public health 
spending as a percentage of GDP over time. We specifically take into account several transmission 
channels. We find evidence of an indirect effect of dependence and abundance through a deterioration 
of state accountability and volatility. The effect of resource dependence and abundance remains 
significant after controlling for several additional factors. Our findings have implications for national 
authorities as well as for the extractive industry and raise questions on innovative ways of channeling 
natural resource revenues towards human capital development.  
The paper is organized as follows. The concept of the resource curse is depicted in Section 2. The third 
section describes the empirical specifications and the determinants of public health spending, including 
the transmission channels through which natural resource wealth could affect public health spending 
and additional control variables. The results and robustness tests are discussed in Section 4 and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2.      THE CONCEPT OF THE RESOURCE CURSE 
It has been observed for some decades now that the possession of natural resources does not 
necessarily generate economic prosperity. On the contrary, it has almost become a conventional 
wisdom that resource wealth represents a curse rather than a blessing. Resource-rich African countries 
have often underperformed, while their resource-poor East-Asian counterparts are on the rise. The 
phrase “natural resource curse” was therefore coined by Auty (1994). 
Pioneering empirical research from Sachs and Warner (1995) shows a significant inverse association 
between the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP and economic growth. Their results have been 
replicated by Davis (2013) and refined by numerous other authors, such as Gylfason et al. (1999), who 
emphasizes the likelihood of reduced investment in human capital. Auty (2001) finds that the per capita 
incomes of resource-poor countries grew between two to three times faster compared to their resource-
rich counterparts. Neumayer (2004) concludes that the curse holds for “genuine income”. Collier and 
Goderis (2007) demonstrate that while resource booms have a positive short-term impact on output, the 
effects for high-rent, non-agricultural commodities are negative in the long run. Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004) find that the indirect adverse effects of natural resources on economic growth outweigh the direct 
positive effects.  Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2011) show that the main effect of resource abundance 
is to increase growth volatility, which in turn reduces long-term growth. Other scholars focus on the role 
of rent-seeking (Torvik, 2002; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006) and corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 
2010; Kasekende et al., 2014). The availability of natural resources has also been argued to make 
states more vulnerable to conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2003).  
A general picture masks some variation. A minority of resource-rich countries seems to have fared 
extremely well, indicating that natural resources are no barrier to economic success.  A great deal of 
literature attempts to explain this variation.  Isham et al. (2005) find that “only countries dependent on 
point-source natural resources are subject to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened 
institutional capacity”. Similarly, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) note that the detrimental volatility 
associated with the resource curse mainly stems from point-source resources. Mehlum et al. (2006) 
argue that the impact of natural capital on growth depends on the quality of institutions. Hodler (2006) 
finds that the effect of resource wealth on income is positive in homogeneous societies and becomes 
increasingly negative as ethnic fractionalization intensifies. 
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The evidence of the existence of the resource curse has been subject of debate. Criticism is mostly 
directed at the trade-based proxies for resource abundance, popularized by Sachs and Warner (1995). 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP is a measure of 
dependence rather than abundance. While this is a valid criticism, it doesn’t imply that the resource 
curse doesn’t hold. Rather it necessitates a clear distinction between resource dependence and 
abundance. Abundance indicates the amount of natural capital that a country has at its disposal, while 
dependence measures the extent to which a country relies on natural resources for its livelihood.  
Typical examples of resource-rich countries with good economic performance, such as Canada and 
Norway, are often not dependent on them. Ding and Field (2005) show that while natural resource 
dependence has a significantly negative effect on growth rates, abundance appears to have a positive 
impact. Daniele (2011) finds that human development, measured by the human development index, is 
negatively affected by resource dependence, but positively by abundance. While we agree, that the 
effects of natural resource dependence and abundance may be markedly different in terms of 
magnitude and significance, we hypothesize that they affect public health expenditures in the same 
direction, as in this particular conception of the resource curse, abundance will set in motion largely the 
same dynamics as dependence. 
Most of the literature has continued to focus on economic performance and empirical research on other 
effects of vast natural resource endowments is still scant. Bulte et al. (2005) find that “the resource 
curse appears to spill over from economic growth to a broader set of development indicators”. 
Carmignani and Avom (2010) find that resource dependence has adverse effects on social 
development. The link between natural resources and inequality has been established by Gylfason and 
Zoega (2002), Fum and Hodler (2010), Goderis and Malone (2011) and Carmignani (2013). Gylfason 
(1999, 2001) demonstrates that school enrolment tends to be inversely related to resource abundance. 
He notes that in 2004, on average public education and health spending in mineral-rich countries 
seemed to be considerably lower than their level of income might suggest (Gylfason, 2008). The author 
does not however, investigate the latter issue in-depth. Sarr and Wick (2010) studied the effect of 
resource wealth on the provision of public goods in authoritarian regimes and find evidence that 
indicates a negative effect on the availability of physical and social infrastructure. Bhattacharyya and 
Collier (2013) show a negative relationship between natural resource rents and public capital stock. 
Finally, de Soyza and Gizelis (2013) argue that oil wealth is associated with higher prevalence and 
mortality rates by HIV/AIDS. In line with this new wave of literature, this paper aims at extending the 
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concept of the natural resource curse further by obtaining additional insights into the impact of resource 
wealth on public health spending. 
 
3.     EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLES 
We constructed a panel dataset for the period of 1995 to 2009 based on several internationally and 
scientifically recognized sources. In line with Brunschweiler and Bulte (2009), Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2010) and Bhattacharyya and Collier (2013), we have subdivided the data into three five year periods; 
from 1995 to 1999, from 2000 to 2004 and finally from 2005 to 2009. To tackle annual volatility and 
measurement errors we use five year averages. Descriptive statistics on the five year averages of all 
variables discussed below of are summarized in Table 1. 
3.1   Public health expenditures 
We use the World Bank data on public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Public Health 
Expenditures), which is derived from data from the World Health Organization. It consists of “recurrent 
and capital spending from government budgets, external borrowings and grants and social health 
insurance funds” (World Bank, 2014a). This spending therefore includes development assistance for 
health from government accounts as well as government health spending from domestic resources.  
Table 1 
3.2   The determinants of public health spending 
3.2.1 Natural resources 
While countries such as Botswana have shown that resource revenues can be harnessed for financing 
public goods such as health (Elovainio and Evans, 2013), the World Bank (2011) notes that natural 
resources may in general hinder the process of human capital creation that is the basis of long term 
growth. The availability of vast natural resource wealth can be argued to affect public expenditure on 
health in several ways. First of all, Gylfason (2001) states that the mere availability of natural capital in a 
country gives rise to a disregard for human capital development and myopic behaviour in general. 
Second, it has been argued that the source of revenue is an important determinant of public 
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expenditures. In particular, Moore (2001) defines resource wealth as “unearned state income”. Through 
natural resource extraction, governments are able to increase their autonomy. This disconnect could 
decrease the need to gain citizens’ support, which consequently diminishes incentives to provide public 
goods such as health care. Resource-rich governments are most likely less dependent on tax revenues 
and politicians may therefore not feel the need to engage in public expenditures that justify taxes. 
Finally, resource revenues are often highly volatile, which complicates longer term planning and leads to 
boom and bust in public spending (Lane, 2003; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009). 
In line with the criticism from Brunschweiler and Bulte (2008) and Lederman and Maloney (2008), we 
avoid using exports-based proxies. Rather, we use the estimates from the World Bank database on the 
Changing Wealth of Nations, which comprises a set of “comprehensive wealth accounts” for over 150 
countries for 1995, 2000 and 2005 and contains estimations of natural capital that are reported in 2005 
US dollars. Natural capital wealth is defined as the sum of the wealth1 stemming from crop, pasture 
land, timber and non-timber forest, protected areas, oil, natural gas, coal and minerals 2. 
3.2.1.1 Natural resource dependence 
Natural resource dependence is of course predominantly determined by resource abundance, as this 
provides countries with a clear comparative advantage (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). However, the 
structural dependence on one sector and therefore the lack of economic diversification could to some 
extent already reflect the government’s inability to effectively manage resource wealth. Moreover, 
perhaps the most effective way to deal with the detrimental volatility associated with commodities is 
diversification. It can therefore be expected that resource dependent economies will especially suffer 
from problems related to volatility. 
In order to take into account a country’s dependence on natural resources, we use the same measure 
as Gylfason (2001) and the World Bank (2011); the share of natural capital in total national wealth 
(Resource Dependence). The latter being defined here as the present value of future consumption that 
is sustainable, discounted at a rate of time preference of 1.5 per cent, over 25 years.  
                                                     
1    The estimates are calculated as the net present value using a discount rate of 4 percent over a 25 year time horizon for renewable 
natural resources and over the time to exhaustion for the non-renewable natural resources (World Bank, 2010). 
2    Bauxite, copper, lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver and iron ore. 
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3.2.1.2 Natural resource abundance 
We use the logarithm of the estimated natural capital per capita as a proxy for resource abundance 
(Resource Abundance) (see Brunschweiller and Bulte, 2009). 
3.2.2 Income 
There exists a large body of literature that shows income to be one of the most important determinants 
of public health expenditures (Lago-Peñas et al., 2013; Costa-Font et al., 2011; Clemente et al., 2004). 
 It has been hypothesized that health care can even be considered to be a luxury good (Getzen, 2000).  
While most studies focus on OECD countries, Okunade (2005) and Murthy and Okunade (2009) confirm 
the importance of GDP for health expenditures in Africa.  
We include the logarithm of the World Bank data on GDP per capita, reported in current US dollars, at 
the beginning of every five year period3 (GDP) (see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009) as well as its 
square (GDP²) to take into account a potential non-linear effect. It has been hypothesized that the 
relationship between income and health is concave (Deaton, 2003), so that income has a larger effect 
among the poor than among the rich. We therefore allow for a decreasing marginal effect of income on 
public health spending. 
3.2.3 Aid 
As income represents a crucial determinant of public health expenditures, supplements to income, such 
as foreign aid, are expected to relax macroeconomic budget constraints and increase resources for 
health care (Okunade, 2005). Moreover, often a substantial proportion of development assistance is 
targeted at the health sector and aims to shift government priorities. Murthy and Okunade (2009) 
demonstrate that aid is an important determinant of health care expenditures. It is important to note that 
part of development assistance for health is targeted at the non-governmental sector and is not reflected 
in the data on public health expenditures. Lu et al. (2010) however, find that development assistance for 
health to the non-governmental sector has a significantly positive effect on domestic government health 
spending. 
To measure the impact of aid, we include five year averages of the World Bank data on one year-lagged 
net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) 
(Aid). According to OECD definitions, ODA consists of “disbursements of loans made on concessional 
                                                     
3     Using the five year averages rather than the initial level of income does not alter our main results. However, we find that the level of 
initial income is a better predictor of public health expenditures relative to GDP. 
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terms and grants by official agencies of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, by 
multilateral institutions and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare” 
(World Bank, 2014b). Repayments of the principal of loans are deducted to arrive at net ODA (DAC, 
2008). We assume zero-values for countries not receiving aid. 
  
3.2.4 Age distribution 
It can easily be argued that the age distribution of the population determines the demand for health  
care and subsequently health spending (di Matteo, 2005; Sen, 2005, Lago-Peñas et al., 2013). 
Traditionally, higher age is associated with more health care utilization 4 (Yang et al., 2003; Dormont et 
al., 2006). Moreover, population ageing exerts an influence on the political prioritization, which could 
result in a demand for higher public health spending (Breyer et al., 2010). To control for the effect of age 
distribution on public health expenditures, we add the proportion of the total population aged 65 and 
above (Pop.>65) to our regression analysis. The data are gathered from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database.   
The baseline empirical model is of the following form: 
 
where i represents a country, t time, α the country fixed effect 5and ɛ the error term. To investigate the 
effect of natural resource abundance, Resource Dependence is replaced by Resource Abundance. 
3.2.5 Transmission channels 
Besides the previously mentioned variables that can be argued to directly affect public health 
expenditures, the following transmission channels could play an important role in explaining the indirect 
effect of natural resources and will therefore be added to the empirical model.  
                                                     
4  This assumption is not without  dispute. It has been suggested that proximity to death represents the main determinant of   health care 
costs (see for example Seshamani and Gray, 2004). 
5  The presence of country fixed effects is validated by the results of the Hausman test. 
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3.2.5.1 State autonomy and unaccountability 
According to the median voter theorem, in an accountable regime, policies reflect the median voter’s 
preferences and will entail social sector support. The unaccountability of political leaders  
may on the contrary, give rise to opportunities for public agents to support rent generating sectors to the 
detriment of social sectors. Persson and Tabellini (2004) confirm that executive accountability influences 
the composition of government spending for a large sample of democracies. In particular, they conclude 
that more accountable regimes are associated with more public goods and larger welfare programs. 
Delavallade (2006) finds that “lack of freedom”, which reflects unaccountability, is an important 
determinant of public sector spending and health expenditures in particular. 
Several scholars have posited that the fiscal link between citizens and their government  in turn is a 
strong determinant of government accountability (Bates and Lien, 1985; North and Weingast, 1989, 
Moore, 2004). Arguably, governments that are able to derive their revenues from natural resources, face 
limited fiscal pressure from their citizens, which will consequently undermine accountability. Moore 
(2001) therefore introduced the idea of resource wealth as a source of “unearned state income” that 
gives rise to state autonomy and unaccountability, which subsequently influences public spending. 
Next to this hypothesized adverse effect, we investigate whether the effect of natural resource wealth on 
public health spending is conditional on the degree of accountability. To this end, we study the 
interaction effects between resource dependence and abundance and state accountability (see Table 1, 
Appendix A).  
We capture this particular transmission channel by including the Polity IV indicator on executive 
constraints. This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making 
powers of chief executives. Limitations may be imposed by any “accountability groups”, which are 
usually legislatures in Western democracies and a strong independent judiciary in many states. This 
measure captures the checks and balances between various parts of the decision-making process. The 
executive constraints measure contains numerical ratings based on a seven-category scale ranging 
from “unlimited authority” to “executive party of subordination” (Marshall et al., 2013). We refer to this 
measure as Accountability. 
The empirical model which takes into account this particular transmission channel looks as follows: 
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Including the interaction effect, the model is of the following form: 
 
where i represents a country, t time,  the country fixed effect5 and ɛ the error term. To investigate the 
effect of natural resource abundance, Resource Dependence is replaced by Resource Abundance. To 
study the impact of other proposed transmission channels, Accountability is replaced by Polity 2, 
Volatility or Peace respectively. 
3.2.5.2 Democracy 
Keefer and Khemani (2005) demonstrate that democracy matters especially for public service delivery 
to the poor, which includes health services. Natural capital and oil wealth in particular in turn have often 
been associated with more autocratic regimes (Tsui, 2011; Ross, 2001). First of all, natural resource 
wealth is argued to increase competition for control of the state. Second, resource-rich authoritarian 
regimes are more likely to oppose democratic development because they will have more to give up from 
losing power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Finally, the unaccountability and autonomy associated 
with resource wealth has been argued to limit pressure for democratic change (Jensen and 
Wantchekon, 2004).  
The level of democratization can therefore be considered as a transmission channel of the adverse 
impact of natural resource wealth on public health spending. The causality of the relationship between 
natural resource wealth and authoritarian regimes however, remains subject of debate (Haber and 
Menaldo, 2011; Alexeev and Conrad, 2009). 
We include the Polity 2 score from the Polity IV dataset (Polity 2) which captures the regime authority 
spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from minus ten, hereditary monarchy, to plus ten, consolidated 
democracy (CSP, 2013). As Bhattacharyya and Collier (2013) conclude that the negative impact of 
natural resources on the public capital stock is moderated by the quality of democracy, we include 
interaction terms to investigate this effect (see Table 1, Appendix A).  
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3.2.5.3 Volatility 
Another commonly mentioned transmission channel of the resource curse that we consider as important 
with regards to the effect on public health spending is the volatile nature of resource revenues, mostly 
as a result of large fluctuations in the value of commodities. There are a number of difficulties that arise 
with a volatile source of income that lead to uncertainty over future financing and complicate longer term 
planning, which will affect public spending. Commodity price volatility also implies that it is not possible 
to protect government revenues derived from them in the long term (Elovainio and Evans, 2013).  
Moreover, it has been argued that revenue volatility induces a certain degree of myopic behaviour (Van 
der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009), which could give rise to a disregard for building human capital. 
Again, we consider the possibility of a different effect of natural resources on public health spending 
conditional on the level of volatility by adding an interaction term to our regressions (see Table 1, 
Appendix A). 
Similar to Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009), we base our measure of volatility on the standard 
deviation of growth in GDP per capita (pc). We define volatility as the standard deviation of GDP per 
capita growth from the 20-year country average applied to every five year period, similar to: 
 
where i represents a country, t time, τ the five year period and N the number of observations. 
3.2.5.4 Conflict 
We also consider the role of conflict as it can be expected to alter government priorities and potentially 
influence public spending. Resource revenues are believed to provide both the motive and financing for 
armed conflict (Ross, 2006). The association between natural resources and the occurrence of conflict 
however, is still subject of debate (Basedau and Lay, 2009; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009; Cotet and 
Tsui, 2013).  
Based on the UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002), we derived a dummy variable 
(Conflict) that equals one in years where conflict is reported to take place in the country, and zero 
otherwise. Alternatively, we derived the years of peace (Peace), by counting the years in which no 
conflict was reported. We control for a potential interaction effect with natural resource wealth (see 
Table 1, Appendix A).  
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3.2.6 Additional control variables6 
With the aim of testing the robustness of our results, we add variables that have been found to play an 
important role in explaining the resource curse and could affect public health spending.  
A demographic factor that is sometimes mentioned in the resource curse literature (Hodler, 2006; Fum 
and Hodler, 2010) and has been found to be important in explaining government spending is ethnic 
fractionalization. “Fractionalized countries are argued to have lower levels of trust, more corruption,  
less transfers, subsidies and political rights” (Alesina et al., 2003), which could ultimately affect public 
social spending. Easterly and Levine (1997) report a strong negative correlation between ethnic 
fragmentation and the provision of public goods in African countries. Shelton (2008) finds that central 
government expenditures on health care are lower in countries with greater ethnic fractionalization. We 
control for this effect by adding an ethnic fractionalization index developed by Desmet et al. (2012). 
Fractionalization (ELF1) measures the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to 
different ethnic groups.  
In line with Gylfason et al. (1999), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), and Boschini et al. (2007), we 
also test our results by controlling for regional fixed effects. Mehlum et al. (2006) for example state that 
a potential concern is that “the resource curse mechanism might be purely an African phenomenon”. We 
therefore introduce dummy variables for Africa and Asia to remove the influence of region-specific 
omitted factors. We explicitly take into account the possibility of a different impact of resource wealth by 
region by introducing interaction terms. 
It has been argued that the effect of natural resources depends on the concentration of the production 
and revenue patterns (Isham et al., 2005; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). We therefore take into 
account the diversification of the primary sector by adding a Herfindahl index (Herfindahl) to the 
regression. The index is calculated as the sum of squares of the shares of the different types of 
resources in total natural capital wealth. We explicitly investigate whether high sector dependence 
aggravates the resource curse effect on public health spending by including interaction effects. 
Finally, in line with Kasekende et al. (2014) we consider the role of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) by adding a dummy variable (EITI) that equals one when countries are 
                                                     
6    In theory it could be argued that ELF1 and the regional dummies should be incorporated into the baseline model, but the nature of 
these particular variables would no longer allow us to conduct fixed effects regression analysis. We therefore opt to add them 
separately. The diversification of the primary sector and EITI membership on the other hand aren’t expected to directly affect public 
health expenditure. The main reason for including these additional variables is in fact, to investigate the possibility of a mediating 
effect on the impact of natural resources. We therefore decided not to include them in our baseline regression specification. 
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either full EITI member or candidates. EITI partner countries are obliged to publicize tax revenues they 
receive from companies in the oil, gas and mining industries, thereby contributing to greater 
transparency between the extractive industry and the authorities with the aim of ultimately increasing 
accountability. Currently, there are 29 compliant countries and 16 candidate countries (EITI, 2014). We 
study the possibility of a mediating effect of EITI membership on the impact of natural resources by 
including an interaction effect. 
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4.     RESULTS 
4.1  Natural resource dependence 
4.1.1 The impact of natural resource dependence on public health spending  
Before proceeding to the results, some remarks about the data analysis are in order. To check for 
collinearity, we applied the diagnostic tools developed by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) and find that 
the conditioning numbers are well below the suggested cut-off value of 30, indicating that there are no 
problems with collinearity. We also report the results of the Hausman test, according to which rejection 
of the null hypothesis implies that the fixed effects model is to be preferred. Due to space constraints we 
limit ourselves to discussing the regressions that are deemed most suitable according to this test. To 
address any remaining within-country correlation, we use cluster-robust standard deviations. Finally, to 
identify outliers, we use the multivariate outlier detection method of Hadi (1992, 1994). The tables below 
display the results of the regression applied to the entire sample as well as to the restricted sample. 
Table 2 
Table 2 summarizes our main results for natural resource dependence. We find evidence of a strong, 
statistically significant, negative relationship between natural resource dependence and public health 
spending relative to GDP, indicating the existence of a public health spending resource curse. We 
continue to find support for this hypothesized resource curse effect even after controlling for income, aid 
and age distribution. According to these estimations, keeping all other factors constant, a ten per cent 
increase in the share of natural capital in total national wealth (Resource Dependence), which 
corresponds for example to the difference between Bolivia (55.12%)  and  Kuwait (65.31%) in 2005, is 
associated with an average decrease of public health expenditures ranging from 0.1 to 0.2 per cent of 
GDP. Bearing in mind that the world average expenditure on health for this period was only 3.7 per cent 
of national GDP (World Bank, 2014a), this represents a considerable difference. 
 
In line with the literature, our results reaffirm the hypothesized role of income in explaining health 
spending variation. In all but two of the regression specifications in Table 2, we find a significant 
coefficient for both the logarithm of initial GDP per capita (GDP) and its squared term (GDP²). We 
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further note that a larger share of aid in GNI (Aid) is associated with higher public spending on health 
relative to GDP. Finally, in the baseline regression specification, the coefficient for the proportion of the 
population aged 65 and above (Pop.>65) is positive and highly significant; suggesting that age structure 
is an important determinant of public health spending. 
To test the robustness of our findings, we repeat the regressions excluding outliers. Except for Aid, all 
the variables remain significant and maintain the expected sign. 
4.1.2 Transmission channels 
Next, we investigate the role of the proposed transmission channels; accountability, democracy, 
volatility and conflict. The results from the fixed effects regressions including the proposed transmission 
channels are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 
The Polity IV indicator on executive constraints (Accountability) is significant at the five per cent level. 
The positive coefficient implies that a higher score, which corresponds to more restrictions on executive 
actions and greater accountability, is associated with higher public health expenditures. Keeping all else 
fixed, a one point increase on the seven point scale of the executive constraints indicator, is associated 
with an increase in public health spending of over 0.1 per cent of GDP.  
By adding the executive constraints indicator, the effect of Resource Dependence declines both in 
magnitude and significance. This could imply that natural resources affect public health expenditures 
through a deterioration of accountability and political institutions. We do not find support for the 
hypothesis that the impact of resource dependence alters conditional on the level of accountability in a 
country. When added to the regression the interaction effect is almost negligible in size and insignificant 
(see Table 1, Appendix A).  
Next, we assess the role of democracy by including the Polity 2 score. The positive coefficient is 
significant only at the ten per cent level, both for the full and restricted sample. Keeping all else fixed a 
ten point increase on the Polity 2 score, which for example corresponds to a change from an autocratic 
regime to an anocracy, is associated with an increase in public health spending of 0.35 per cent of GDP. 
Again, we find no support of a conditional resource curse effect.  
We further note that the coefficient for Volatility, measured as the standard deviation of growth in per 
capita GDP, is negative and significant at the one per cent level. Hence, it exerts a negative influence 
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on public spending relative to GDP. This is as expected as volatility is bound to complicate longer-term 
planning and might induce a certain degree of shortsightedness. We find no indication however, that the 
magnitude of the impact of natural resource dependence differs depending on the degree of volatility as 
there is no significant interaction effect (see Table 1, Appendix A).   
 
The results do not indicate that conflict is a significant determinant of public expenditures on health. 7 
While our results confirm the role of years of peace (Peace) as a positive determinant of public health 
spending for the entire sample, the effect is not robust to excluding outliers. We don’t find any evidence 
for the hypothesis that the effect of natural resources alters conditional on the years of peace. 
We conclude that the results strongly suggest that unaccountability and volatility act as main 
transmission channels of the adverse impact of natural resource dependence on public health spending. 
We find no support for any conditional resource curse effect. In sum, we derive the following model to 
investigate the overall effect of the main transmission channels: 
 
where i represents a country, t time,  the country fixed effect5 and ɛ the error term. 
Interestingly, adding the variables on both main transmission channels renders the effect of Resource 
Dependence insignificant for the entire sample. While it remains significant at the five per cent level 
when excluding outliers, the great reduction in the magnitude of the effect suggests that at least part of 
the impact of natural resource dependence on public health spending relative to GDP can be attributed 
to problems related to state unaccountability and volatility.  
To estimate the indirect effects of natural resource dependence, we apply the method from Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh (2004). First, we estimate the effect of natural resource dependence on accountability and 
volatility: 
 
                                                     
7 Additional information can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request. 
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where i represents a country, t time, and  the country fixed effects5 and  and  the error terms.  
Substituting equations 5, 6 and 7 into equation 1 yields: 
 
where  is the direct effect of resource dependence on public spending on 
health and  the indirect effect through a deterioration of 
accountability and volatility respectively.  
We find that this indirect effect explains about 12 per cent of the total adverse effect of Resource 
Dependence on Public health Expenditures. 
4.1.3 Additional control variables 
We find limited support for an adverse effect of ethnic fractionalization, as measured by ELF1, on public 
health expenditures relative to GDP8 (see Table 4). Our main results remain robust. 
Table 4 
In order to investigate potential regional effects, we introduce dummy variables for Africa and Asia. As 
the latter are time invariant, we use a random effects regression model (see Table 4). Our results 
indicate that Asian countries spend on average up to one per cent of GDP less on public health 
compared to the rest of the world. There is some evidence that the impact of resource dependence 
spending differs by region, as the interaction effect between Africa and Resource Dependence is 
significantly negative when excluding outliers (see Table 2, Appendix A). This indicates that the health 
spending resource curse is stronger in Africa. 
Our results don’t show a significant main effect of the diversification of the primary sector8, as measured 
by the Herfindahl index. Nor do we find evidence of an interaction with resource dependence. Finally, 
                                                     
8    As the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index displays little variation over time, the within estimator is no longer appropriate and we 
apply a random effects regression 
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we investigate the role of EITI. Given EITI’s short existence, a panel regression is no longer feasible and 
we conduct an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the period of 2005 to 2009. We find no 
support for a positive effect of EITI membership on public health spending (see Table 3, Appendix A), 
nor do the results indicate a mediating effect on the impact of resource dependence.9  
 
4.2   Natural resource abundance 
4.2.1 The impact of natural resource abundance on public health spending  
As aforementioned, it is important to differentiate between resource dependence and abundance, as 
there are countries that are highly dependent on natural resources while the latter are not abundantly 
available and vice versa.  
Take for example Chad, a country that is estimated to obtain up to 90 percent of its wealth from natural 
resources, while according to World Bank estimations its per capita natural capital falls well below the 
median. Moreover, Chad’s public health spending relative to GDP has consistently been below the 
regional average. On the contrary, countries such as Norway, Australia and Canada, where natural 
capital contributes to less than ten per cent of total wealth and that are known to have high public 
expenditures on health, are endowed with the largest natural capital reserves in the world. We therefore 
repeat the regressions using the logarithm of total natural capital per capita as a measure for resource 
abundance. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5 
We find strong support for a health spending resource curse effect of the mere availability of natural 
capital. The negative coefficient for Resource Abundance is significant at the five per cent level for all 
regression specifications. Perhaps most important for the purpose of this paper, controlling for income, 
aid and age distribution doesn’t alter the significance or the magnitude of the adverse effect of Resource 
Abundance. According to our baseline regression specification, keeping all else fixed, a ten per cent 
increase in natural capital per capita, which corresponds roughly for example to the difference  between 
                                                     
9   This is however not surprising as the EITI is still a new concept. Moreover, questions are rising about the effectiveness of this 
mechanism and its current regulations (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Ölcer, 2009). Pitlik et al. (2010) and Kasekende et al. (2014) have 
also demonstrated that EITI membership is prone to self-selection bias as the initiative mostly attracts poor countries with a marked 
corruption problem. 
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Angola (13306.6 USD) and the Republic of Congo (14679.44 USD) in 2005, is associated with an 
average decrease of public expenditures on health ranging from 0.04 to 0.05 per cent of GDP.   
Other coefficients also seem to be plausibly estimated and are similar to what we found for the 
regressions including Resource Dependence. While we find rather limited support for the non-linear 
relationship between the initial level of GDP per capita and public health expenditures, income clearly is 
an important positive determinant of public health spending. The share of ODA in GNI (Aid) has a highly 
significant positive effect on public health expenditure. Finally, our results strongly confirm that an 
ageing population leads to higher public expenditure on health.  
4.2.2 Transmission channels 
We investigate the role of the proposed transmission channels in explaining the effect of resource 
abundance. We find that a higher score with regards to executive constraints, which is associated with 
more accountability, corresponds to higher public health spending. The highly significant, negative 
coefficient for the standard deviation of per capita growth (Volatility), once more suggests that volatility 
is a negative determinant of public health spending. We further demonstrate that the positive effect  
of democracy, as captured by the Polity 2 score, is significant at the five per cent level.  
 
The results don’t show a significant effect of conflict8. The coefficient for years of peace (Peace) is 
significantly positive only for the restricted sample. We find no significant interaction effects (see Table 
1, Appendix A). 
Table 6 
To investigate the overall effect of the main transmission channels10 and in line with equation (5), we 
estimate the model including both the executive constraints indicator (Accountability) and the standard 
deviation of per capita growth (Volatility).  
Similar to our previous findings related to dependence, we observe a slight reduction in the magnitude 
of the effect of Resource Abundance when including both proposed main transmission channels. The 
effect however, remains significant at the five per cent level. When calculating the direct and indirect 
effects of natural resource abundance according to the method of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), we 
                                                     
10 We note that the Polity 2 index is based on the executive constraints indicator. Adding both variables to the regression is therefore 
deemed unsuitable because of their high correlation. 
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find that the main transmission channels’ indirect effect accounts for approximately 15 per cent of the 
overall effect of Resource Abundance on Public Health Expenditures. 
4.2.3 Additional control variables 
The regression results (see Table 7) show a significantly negative effect of ethnic fractionalization 
(ELF1) on public health spending relative to GDP for the entire sample. Excluding the outliers, the 
results of the regression analysis of the restricted sample confirm the hypothesized negative effect of 
natural resource abundance on public health spending. 
Table 7 
On average, public health expenditures are significantly lower in Asia compared to the rest of the world. 
Moreover, there is some indication of an aggravated resource curse effect in this region. Our results 
confirm that the negative effect of resource abundance on public health expenditures is significantly 
stronger in Africa (see Table 2, Appendix A).  
Finally, we find no support for the role of diversification of the primary sector8.  The results of the OLS 
regression for the period of 2004 to 2009, don’t show a significant coefficient for EITI, nor do we find 
evidence of a mediating effect on the impact of natural resource abundance (see Table 3, Appendix A). 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Time fixed effects 
To test the robustness of our results, we add time fixed effects to our baseline regression model. As 
such, we control for unobserved effects that vary over time as well as over countries. The results are 
summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8 
In line with the findings of Lu et al. (2010), we note that the time dummies are highly significant and 
indicate a general increasing trend in public health expenditures relative to GDP over time. The adverse 
effect of both natural resource dependence and abundance however, is robust to controlling for time 
fixed effects as they decrease neither in magnitude nor in significance. Interestingly, the effect of aid 
dependency on public health expenditures appears to be considerably larger in terms of magnitude as 
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well as significance. To the extent that the time period dummies reflect omitted variables, this suggests 
that our previous results for the effect of aid could be biased downwards. The impact of age structure on 
the other hand, is no longer statistically significant. This is however in line with our expectations as 
changes in the share of the population aged 65 and above mostly reflect general trends over time. 
4.3.2 Public health expenditures relative to government expenditures 
As a final robustness check, we verify whether the curse holds with a different measure of health 
spending by applying our baseline regression model to public health expenditures relative to total 
government expenditures11. 
Table 9 
The results of the regression analysis of the restricted sample, excluding outliers, confirm the 
hypothesized negative effect of both resource dependence and abundance on public health spending 
as percentage of government expenditures.  
 
5.     CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to the literature on the resource curse by empirically investigating how natural 
resource wealth affects public health spending. Little attention has been paid to this matter so far, while 
research indicates that health care is crucial to building human capital and securing sustainable 
economic growth. This is especially important for developing countries as improving the health status of 
their citizens could substantially ameliorate their economic performance. Moreover, it has been shown 
that public spending on health care matters more for the poor in general (Gupta et al., 2003). Finally, 
this paper is innovative as it examines the effects of natural resources on inputs rather than human 
development outcomes as the latter might reflect factors beyond policymakers’ control. 
We study the impact of natural resources on public health expenditures relative to GDP in light of the 
hypothesis that the availability of resource wealth as a source of unearned state income enhances state 
autonomy and volatility, which leads to policies that fail to prioritize human development. We find a 
                                                     
11     We prefer to use public health expenditures relative to GDP in our main analyses as by using public health expenditures relative to 
government expenditures, we lose information on the size of the government. Moreover, introducing total government spending in the 
denominator of our indicator renders our results sensitive to the evolution of other types of government spending, including military 
expenditures. This could potentially distort results, especially in the presence of conflict. 
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robust, significant inverse relationship between natural resource dependence and public health 
spending relative to GDP. Moreover, we find that part of this adverse effect can be attributed to the 
proposed transmission channels of state accountability and volatility. The effect of resource dependence 
remains significant even after controlling for other variables such as income, aid, the age structure of the 
population, the level of democratization, conflict, ethnic fractionalization and regional effects. 
Furthermore, our regression results show that the mere availability of natural resources (or resource 
abundance) has a significantly negative effect on public health expenditures relative to GDP. While this 
effect appears to be slightly less robust than the relationship between resource dependence and public 
health expenditure, it remains significant when adding most of the additional control variables. 
The establishment of the existence of a resource curse effect on public health expenditures underlines 
the importance of government accountability and transparency with regards to natural resource wealth. 
While we find no evidence of a mediating effect so far, the best instrument currently being promoted for 
ensuring greater transparency is the EITI. Governments should be made accountable for resource 
wealth, not only through transparent declaration, but also correct taxation and redistribution of natural 
resource capital. Following our findings, a substantial part of the tax revenues could for example be 
earmarked for the health sector. Our results also urge the extractive industry to invest in sustainable 
Corporate Social Responsibility operations, especially in the health sector and/or to increase health 
funding through other innovative channels of development finance. 
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TABLES 
 Table 1: Descriptive statistics  Obs. Countries Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum     Overall Between Within   3.1       Public Health Expenditures 560 188 3.6017 2.2432 2.1848 0.5403 0.0385 16.2833          3.2.1.1 Resource Abundance 423 153 8.6775 1.4728 1.4224 0.2079 0.6857 12.2696 3.2.1.2 Resource Dependence 423 153 28.6443 31.9413 30.3933 9.5926 0 243.9587 3.2.2    GDP 579 199 8.0548 1.6706 1.6677 0.1604 3.9129 11.7488 3.2.3    Aid 642 214 5.3876 10.0595 8.5820 5.2700 -0.1540 110.4498 3.2.4    Pop. > 65 582 194 7.0250 4.6957 4.6689 0.5717 0.5679 21.0439  3.2.5.1 Accountability 473 162 4.7912 2.0721 2.0048 0.5578 1 7 3.2.5.2 Volatility 570 197 4.3392 4.5817 3.8219 2.6273 0.4742 43.6227 3.2.5.3 Polity 2  480 163 3.1133 6.5191 6.3552 1.5229 -10 10 3.2.5.4 Peace 642 214 34.3914 24.1479 23.6996 4.8170 0 61.5          3.2.6    ELF1   15.9519 18.1370 18.1669 0 0 64.6600              Herfindahl 413 150 0.4089 0.1656 0.1641 0.0497 0.1445 0.9986 Source: World Bank, Polity IV, UCD/PRIO          
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Table 2: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures   excl. outl.  excl. outl.  excl. outl.  excl.outl. Res. Dep. -0.0102*** (0.010) -0.0208*** (0.000) -0.0087** (0.039) -0.0185*** (0.001) -0.0093** (0.024) -0.0205*** (0.000) -0.0095** (0.023) -0.0207*** (0.000) GDP   -2.7465* (0.091) -3.1114*   (0.069) -2.3393 (0.134) -3.5140** (0.017) -1.9097 (0.210) -3.210** (0.026) GDP²   0.2548*** (0.008) 0.2727*** (0.007) 0.2333** (0.012) 0.2966*** (0.001) 0.1861** (0.036) 0.2552*** (0.002) Aid     0.0156*** (0.009) 0.0202 (0.240) 0.0146** (0.017) 0.0171 (0.428) Pop.>65       0.1746*** (0.002) 0.1832*** (0.001)          Obs. 417 407 413 402 413 398 407 392 Countries 150 148 150 148 150 148 148 147 Within R² 0.0481 0.1056 0.1949 0.2416 0.2114 0.2659 0.2474 0.3075 Between R² 0.1922 0.2802 0.5182 0.5383 0.5246 0.5458 0.6226 0.6260 Overall R² 0.1742 0.2712 0.5009 0.5304 0.5077 0.5414 0.6037 0.6311 Hausman (0.0017) (0.0149) (0.0188) (0.0149) (0.0048) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0000) Notes: Res. Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. The Hausman test results are based on the non-robust standard errors. 
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 Table 3: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures   excl. outl. a  excl. outl.   excl. outl. a  excl. outl. a  excl. outl. Res. Dep. -0.0073* (0.068) -0.0071* (0.078) -0.0081** (0.050) -0.0081* (0.052) -0.0077** (0.036) -0.0157*** (0.001) -0.0067** (0.023) -0.0210*** (0.000) -0.0054 (0.111) -0.0053* (0.083) GDP -1.8352 (0.232) -2.1702 (0.131) -2.1570 (0.152) -2.2527 (0.110) -1.9116 (0.139) -2.2702 (0.152) -1.3878*** (0.005) -3.1310** (0.030) -1.8379 (0.168) -1.2235 (0.395) GDP² 0.1891**   (0.035) 0.2064** (0.015) 0.2071** (0.019) 0.2122** (0.011) 0.1813** (0.022) 0.1990** (0.033) 0.1096*** (0.001) 0.2460*** (0.003) 0.1848** (0.027) 0.1529* (0.082) Aid 0.0097 (0.102) -0.0001 (0.994) 0.0140** (0.011) 0.0115 (0.530) 0.0083 (0.126) 0.0066 (0.745) 0.0182*** (0.001) 0.0148    (0.416) 0.0051 (0.339) 0.0260* (0.066) Pop.>65 0.1464** (0.013) 0.1492** (0.011) 0.1471** (0.011) 0.1477**   (0.011) 0.1824*** (0.002) 0.1866*** (0.002) 0.1670*** (0.000) 0.1752*** (0.002) 0.1510** (0.015) 0.1444** (0.022) Accountability 0.1055** (0.023) 0.1055** (0.029)       0.0744* (0.071) 0.0782* (0.051) Polity 2    0.0354* (0.051) 0.0351* (0.061)       Volatility     -0.0685*** (0.000) -0.0564*** (0.002)   -0.0636*** (0.000) -0.0779*** (0.000) Peace       0.0108*** (0.008) 0.0056 (0.322)              Obs. 371 369 377 375 404 385 407 393 368 365 Countries 136 136 137 137 148 146 148 147 136 135 Within R² 0.2581 0.2492 0.2569 0.2460 0.3104 0.3111 0.2288 0.3130 0.3141 0.3133 Between R² 0.6196 0.6201 0.6322 0.6332 0.6253 0.6216 0.6714 0.6342 0.6201 0.6272 Overall R² 0.5987 0.5967 0.6118 0.6106 0.6105 0.6249 0.6593 0.6394 0.6021 0.6080 Hausman (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0056) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) Notes: a Outliers were identified using the method of Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000). Res. Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. The Hausman test results are based on the non-robust standard errors. 
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Table 4: Results random effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures   excl. outl.  excl. outl. Res. Dep. -0.0062** (0.041) -0.0149*** (0.000) -0.0067** (0.027) -0.0147*** (0.000) GDP -1.2045** (0.015) -1.3582** (0.022) -1.3722*** (0.005) -1.4971*** (0.010) GDP² 0.1031*** (0.001) 0.1125 (0.002) 0.1136*** (0.000) 0.1210*** (0.001) Aid 0.0194*** (0.001) 0.0400*** (0.001) 0.0184*** (0.002) 0.0363*** (0.005) Pop. > 65 0.1645*** (0.000) 0.1596*** (0.000) 0.1484*** (0.000) 0.1384*** (0.000) ELF1 -0.0109* (0.066) -0.0080 (0.203)   Africa   -0.2278 (0.396) -0.2607 (0.338) Asia   -0.9910*** (0.000) -0.9805*** (0.001)      Obs. 407 392 407 394 Countries 148 146 148 147 Within R² 0.2226 0.2774 0.2257 0.2897 Between R² 0.6714 0.6812 0.7015 0.7020 Overall R² 0.6539 0.6774 0.6852 0.7078 Notes: Res. Dep. stands for Resource Dependence. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
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 Table 5 : Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures   excl. outl.  excl. outl.  excl. outl.  excl.outl. Res. Ab. -0.3878** (0.020) -0.4217** (0.014) -0.3411** (0.037) -0.3782** (0.026) -0.3576** (0.030) -0.4502*** (0.006) -0.4045** (0.014) -0.4892*** (0.002) GDP   -2.0175 (0.198) -2.2636 (0.150) -1.5864 (0.289) -2.2441 (0.131) -1.2041 (0.405) -1.8832 (0.178) GDP²   0.2151** (0.022) 0.2325** (0.013) 0.1923** (0.033) 0.2333*** (0.009) 0.1494* (0.080) 0.1922** (0.018) Aid     0.0146*** (0.008) 0.0224 (0.141) 0.0137** (0.016) 0.0278* (0.071) Pop.>65       0.1675*** (0.004) 0.1738*** (0.004)          Obs. 417 411 413 407 413 402 407 397 Countries 150 148 150 148 150 148 148 146 Within R² 0.0318 0.0359 0.1873 0.1982 0.2018 0.2224 0.2418 0.2684 Between R² 0.0684 0.0728 0.4945 0.5668 0.4989 0.5803 0.5911 0.6722 Overall R² 0.0614 0.0634 0.4783 0.5502 0.4830 0.5672 0.5717 0.6567 Hausman  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0042) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0134) (0.0000) (0.0001) Notes: Res. Ab. stands for Resource Abundance. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. The Hausman test results are based on the non-robust standard errors. 
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 Table 6 : Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures   excl. outl. a  excl. outl. a  excl. outl.  excl. outl.  excl. outl. . a Res. Ab. -0.4458*** (0.008) -0.4624*** (0.006) -0.4752***   (0.006) -0.4960*** (0.004) -0.3140** (0.043) -0.3705** (0.017) -0.3942** (0.016) -0.3637*** (0.001) -0.3560** (0.027) -0.3732** (0.021) GDP -1.3952 (0.346) -2.0737 (0.131) -1.6349 (0.252) -2.0813 (0.121) -1.3748 (0.275) -1.3179 (0.364) -1.1634 (0.421) -0.7915 (0.147) -1.6012 (0.229) -1.3562 (0.330) GDP² 0.1673* (0.055) 0.2078*** (0.010) 0.1808** (0.032) 0.2095*** (0.008) 0.1543** (0.049) 0.1580 (0.071) 0.1418* (0.100) 0.0923*** (0.006) 0.1753** (0.036) 0.1685** (0.049) Aid 0.0100* (0.088) -0.0003 (0.986) 0.0140*** (0.008) 0.0105 (0.546) 0.0075 (0.174) 0.0300** (0.030) 0.01338** (0.020) 0.0371*** (0.002) 0.0055 (0.321) 0.0244* (0.075) Pop.>65 0.1294** (0.025) 0.1393** (0.016) 0.1300** (0.024) 0.1378** (0.016) 0.1754*** (0.004) 0.1741*** (0.005) 0.1588*** (0.007) 0.1453*** (0.000) 0.1339** (0.030) 0.1308** (0.036) Accountability 0.1023** (0.018) 0.1040** (0.023)       0.0725* (0.064) 0.0784** (0.042) Polity 2   0.0367** (0.030) 0.0366** (0.037)       Volatility     -0.0689*** (0.000) -0.0705*** (0.000)   -0.0622*** (0.000) -0.0735*** (0.000) Peace       0.0066 (0.263) 0.0103*** (0.010)              Obs. 371 366 377 372 404 391 407 396 368 362 Countries 136 135 136 136 148 145 148 146 136 134 Within R² 0.2744 0.2804 0.2721 0.2756 0.3050 0.2969 0.2458 0.2508   0.3265 0.3346 Between R² 0.5897 0.6608 0.5978 0.6730 0.6039 0.6719 0.6000 0.7075 0.5979 0.6654 Overall R² 0.5709 0.6408 0.5797 0.6538 0.5872 0.6579 0.5809 0.6957 0.5800 0.6484 Hausman (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0001) Notes: a Outliers were identified using the method of Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000). Res. Ab. stands for Resource Abundance. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. The Hausman test results are based on the non-robust standard errors. 
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Table 7: Results random effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures   excl. outl.  excl.outl. Res. Ab. -0.0587 (0.667) -0.3443*** (0.001) -0.0937 (0.493) -0.3899*** (0.000) GDP -0.9731** (0.042) -0.5344 (0.308) -1.0864** (0.029) -0.7435 (0.168) GDP² 0.0925*** (0.003) 0.0811** (0.012) 0.1006*** (0.001) 0.0947*** (0.004) Aid 0.0175*** (0.001) 0.0476*** (0.000) 0.0166*** (0.002) 0.0450*** (0.000) Pop. > 65 0.1685*** (0.000) 0.1493*** (0.000) 0.1540*** (0.000) 0.1223*** (0.000) ELF1 -0.0131** (0.037) -0.0068 (0.197)   Africa   -0.2213 (0.405) -0.3921 (0.146) Asia   -1.0027***   (0.000) -0.9663*** (0.000)      Obs. 407 397 407 397 Countries 148 146 148 146 Within R² 0.1947 0.2398 0.2045 0.2432 Between R² 0.6720 0.7050 0.6962 0.7360 Overall R² 0.6524 0.6886 0.6781 0.7178 Notes: Res. Ab. stands for Resource Abundance. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
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Table 8: Results fixed effects regression on Public Health Expenditures ( incl. time fixed effects)   excl. outl.  excl. outl. Resource Dependence -0.0101*** (0.010) -0.0211 (0.000)   Resource Abundance   -0.4252***   (0.006) -0.5146*** (0.001) GDP -2.1689 (0.128) -3.1956** (0.018) -1.2526 (0.351) -1.8086 (0.168)  GDP² 0.1362 (0.107) 0.1959** (0.012) 0.0922 (0.252) 0.1302* (0.089) Aid 0.0189*** (0.001) 0.0273** (0.040) 0.0185*** (0.001) 0.0320** (0.013) Pop.>65  0.0832 (0.181) 0.0875 (0.158) 0.0824 (0.194) 0.0930 (0.140) 
Time fixed effects      2000-2004 0.2736*** (0.000) 0.2821*** (0.000) 0.3038*** (0.000) 0.3024*** (0.000) 2005-2009 0.5191*** (0.000) 0.4954*** (0.000) 0.4914*** (0.000) 0.4722*** (0.000)      Obs. 407 392 407 396 Countries 148 146 148 146 Within R² 0.3360 0.3888 0.3256 0.3462 Between R² 0.4722 0.4446 0.2792 0.3980 Overall R² 0.4803   0.4814 0.2873 0.4185 Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
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 Table 9: Results fixed effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures  as a % of Government Expenditure   excl. outl.  excl. outl. Resource Dependence -0.0214 (0.130) -0.0531*** (0.005)   Resource Abundance   -0.8963* (0.069) -1.1028** (0.018) GDP -9.0249 (0.122) -14.1952** (0.011) -7.4176 (0.172) -10.8837** (0.047)  GDP² 0.7068** (0.029) 0.9718*** (0.002) 0.6231** (0.041) 0.8218*** (0.007) Aid 0.0412 (0.215) -0.0221 (0.819) 0.0391 (0.221) 0.0146 (0.831) Pop.>65 0.2939* (0.051) 0.3448** (0.020) 0.2781* (0.080) 0.3080* (0.055)      Obs. 407 392 407 397 Countries 148 147 148 146 Within R² 0.1375 0.1905 0.1337 0.1516 Between R² 0.1982 0.1795 0.1789 0.2014 Overall R² 0.1795 0.1789 0.1631 0.1888 Hausman (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
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Appendix A : Additional regression results 
      
 Table 1: Results fixed effects regression on Public Health Expenditures (incl. interaction effects) 
  excl. outl.a  excl. outl. a  excl. outl.  excl. outl. a  excl. outl. a  excl. outl  excl. outl  excl. outl 
Res.Dep. -0.0053 (0.353) -0.0052 (0.362) -0.0090** (0.034) -0.0090** (0.034) -0.0051 (0.216) -0.0316* (0.068) -0.0076** (0.027) -0.0175*** (0.001)         
Res. Ab.         -0.0265 (0.941) -0.0865 (0.809) -0.3572* (0.084) -0.3890*   (0.061) -0.3388** (0.037) -0.2944* (0.056) -0.4688** (0.023) -0.3578*** (0.009) 
GDP -1.8992 (0.226) -1.9553 (0.198) -2.3245 (0.131) -2.3551 (0.112) -1.8866 (0.137) -7.5408*** (0.000) -1.4273*** (0.003) -2.7326* (0.057) -1.3895 (0.339) -1.6671 (0.240) -1.6565 (0.239) -1.9187 (0.157) -1.4459 (0.246) -1.1196 (0.519) -1.1516 (0.427) -0.8111 (0.126) 
GDP²  0.1921** (0.035) 0.1949** (0.028) 0.2147** (0.017) 0.2163** (0.013) 0.1815** (0.022) 0.4773*** (0.000) 0.1120*** (0.000) 0.2287*** (0.007) 0.1669* (0.052) 0.1863** (0.026) 0.1817** (0.029) 0.2004** (0.013) 0.1587** (0.041) 0.1493 (0.142) 0.1416 (0.102) 0.0962***   (0.003) 
Aid 0.0110 (0.113) 0.0085 (0.483) 0.0157*** (0.009) 0.0147 (0.203) 0.0066 (0.246) 0.0182 (0.846) 0.0178*** (0.001) 0.0287 (0.154) 0.0092 (0.121) 0.0088 (0.443) 0.0139*** (0.006) 0.0140 (0.171) 0.0072 (0.210) 0.0138 (0.427) 0.0136** (0.022) 0.0445*** (0.000) 
Pop.>65 0.1460** (0.013) 0.1465** (0.013) 0.1484** (0.011) 0.1486** (0.011) 0.1822*** (0.002) 0.2316*** (0.002) 0.1684*** (0.000) 0.1788*** (0.002) 0.1185** (0.041) 0.1258** (0.030) 0.1213** (0.035) 0.1285** (0.026) 0.1766*** (0.004) 0.1692*** (0.007) 0.1624*** (0.007) 0.1331*** (0.000) 
Acc. 0.1323** (0.020) 0.1297** (0.021)       0.7732 (0.105) 0.7093 (0.140)       
Acc.*Res. Dep. -0.0006 (0.646) -0.0006 (0.643)               
Acc.*Res. Ab.         -0.0806 (0.148) -0.0780 (0.192)       
Polity2   0.0534*** (0.005) 0.0530*** (0.006)       0.2518 (0.108) 0.2317 (0.142)     
Pol.2.*Res.Dep.   -0.0004 (0.384) -0.0004 (0.387)             
Pol.2.*Res.Ab.           -0.0260 (0.162) -0.0235 (0.208)     
Volatility     -0.0424* (0.074) -0.1142** (0.035)       -0.1218 (0.145) 0.0751 (0.758)   
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Vol.*Res.Dep.     -0.0006 (0.276) 0.0026 (0.551)           
Vol.*Res.Ab.             0.0065 (0.526) -0.0132 (0.623)   
Peace       0.0097* (0.070) 0.0033 (0.638)       -0.0139 (0.737) -0.0177 (0.504) 
Peace*Res.Dep       0.0000 (0.721) 0.0000 (0.884)         
Peace*Res.Ab               0.0024 (0.607) 0.0032 (0.303) 
                 
Obs. 371 370 377 376 404 385 407 385 371 367 377 373 404 365 407 389 
Countries 136 136 137 137 148 146 148 145 136 135 137 136 148 139 148 144 
Within R² 0.2595 0.2531 0.2627 0.2563 0.3141 0.3146 0.2263 0.3142 0.2852 0.2905 0.2816 0.2873 0.3059 0.2933 0.2475 0.2642 
Between R² 0.6229 0.6233 0.6386 0.6393 0.6196 0.6168 0.6738 0.6530 0.5815 0.6424 0.5857 0.6499 0.6030 0.6661 0.6106 0.7301 
Overall R² 0.6021 0.6010   0.6187 0.6182 0.6051   0.6188 0.6618 0.6528 0.5632 0.6231 0.5681 0.6313 0.5866 0.6626 0.5917 0.7217 
Hausman test (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0608) (0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.006) (0.0157) 
Notes: a Outliers were identified using the method of Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000). Res. Dep. , Res. Ab. And Pol.2  stand for Resource Dependence,  Resource Abundance and Polity 2 respectively. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
The Hausman test results are based on the non-robust standard errors. 
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Table 2 :  Results random effects regressions on Public Health Expenditures (incl. interaction effects) 
    excl.outl. 
Res. Dep. -0.0041 (0.454) -0.0070 (0.195)   
Res. Ab.   0.0228 (0.769) -0.1063 (0.367) 
GDP -1.4743*** (0.004) -1.779*** (0.004) -0.5758 (0.281) -0.42271 (0.422) 
GDP² 0.1199*** (0.000) 0.1381*** (0.000) 0.0708** (0.036) 0.0765** (0.015) 
Aid 0.0186*** (0.002) 0.0346*** (0.009) 0.0174*** (0.001) 0.0454*** (0.000) 
Pop. > 65 0.1526*** (0.000) 0.1488*** (0.000) 0.1626*** (0.000) 0.1214*** (0.000) 
Africa 0.0864 (0.804) 0.2419 (0.494) 4.9266** (0.013) 4.2365** (0.039) 
Africa*Res.Dep. -0.0082 (0.253) -0.0159** (0.042)   
Africa*Res.Ab.   -0.5948*** (0.010) -0.5207** (0.028) 
Asia -1.1212*** (0.001) -1.0007*** (0.009) -0.6927 (0.706) 2.3146 (0.102) 
Asia*Res.Dep 0.0033 (0.624) -0.0012 (0.891)   
Asia*Res.Ab. 
 
  -0.0210 (0.918) -0.3570** (0.022) 
     
Obs. 407 394 407 397 
Countries 148 147 148 146 
Within R² 0.2317 0.2966 0.2480 0.2714 
Between R² 0.7103 0.7100 0.6987 0.7391 
Overall R² 0.6957 0.7143 0.6850 0.7214 
Notes: Res. Dep. and Res. Ab. stand for Resource Dependence and Resource Abundance. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
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Table 3: Results OLS regressions on Public Health Expenditures (2004-2009) 
  excl. outl. a  excl. outl. a  excl. outl. a  excl. outl. a 
Res. Dep -0.0064** (0.037) -0.0077** (0.019) -0.0049 (0.358) -0.0070 (0.219)     
Res. Ab.     0.0524 (0.748) 0.0689 (0.660) 0.0624 (0.713) 0.0749 (0.647) 
GDP -2.0054** (0.012) -0.2820 (0.707) -1.9382** (0.017) -0.2560 (0.741) -2.1515*** (0.007) -0.6488 (0.365) 0.0624** (0.012) -0.6074 (0.402) 
GDP² 0.1485*** (0.002) 0.0575 (0.203) 0.1448*** (0.003) 0.0561 (0.227) 0.1548*** (0.001) 0.0756* (0.082) 0.1506*** (0.002) 0.0734* (0.097) 
Aid 0.0288 (0.193) 0.1280*** (0.000) 0.0299 (0.174) 0.1283*** (0.000) 0.0234 (0.262) 0.1127*** (0.000) 0.0234 (0.260) 0.1122*** (0.000) 
Pop.>65 0.1780*** (0.000) 0.1837*** (0.000) 0.1811*** (0.000) 0.1850*** (0.000) 0.1982*** (0.000) 0.2078*** (0.000) 0.1986*** (0.000) 0.2080*** (0.000) 
EITI -0.1365 (0.591) -0.0613 (0.793) -0.0136 (0.970) -0.0218 (0.954) -0.2180 (0.404) -0.1452 (0.558) 0.7117 (0.730) 0.4207 (0.836) 
EITI*Res.Dep.   -0.0032 (0.606) -0.0010 (0.916)     
EITI*Res.Ab.       -0.1079 (0.651) -0.0657 (0.782) 
         
Countries 147 146 147 145 147 146 147 146 
R² 0.6456 63.81 0.6462 53.81 55.39 65.35 47.14 55.66 
Notes: a Outliers were identified using the method of Billor, Hadi, and Velleman (2000). Res. Dep. and Res. Ab. stand for Resource Dependence and Resource Abundance. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Reported p-values are based on cluster-robust standard errors. 
 
48 
 
 
APPENDIX B : LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
Albania Finland Moldova Turkey 
Algeria France Mongolia Uganda 
Angola Gabon Morocco Ukraine 
Argentina Gambia, The Mozambique United Arab Emirates 
Armenia Georgia Namibia United Kingdom 
Australia Germany Nepal United States 
Austria Ghana Netherlands Uruguay 
Azerbaijan Greece New Zealand Uzbekistan 
Bahrain Grenada Nicaragua Vanuatu 
Bangladesh Guatemala Niger Venezuela, RB 
Belarus Guinea Nigeria Vietnam 
Belgium Guinea-Bissau Norway Zambia 
Belize Guyana Oman  
Benin Haiti Pakistan  
Bhutan Honduras Panama  
Bolivia Hungary Papua New Guinea  
Botswana Iceland Peru  
Brazil India Philippines  
Brunei Darussalam Indonesia Poland  
Bulgaria Iran, Islamic Rep. Portugal  
Burkina Faso Ireland Romania  
Burundi Israel Russian Federation  
Cambodia Italy Rwanda  
Cameroon Jamaica Saudi Arabia  
Canada Japan Senegal  
Central African Republic Jordan Seychelles  
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Chad Kenya Sierra Leone  
Chile Korea, Rep. Singapore  
China Kuwait Slovak Republic  
Colombia Kyrgyz Republic South Africa  
Comoros Lao PDR Spain  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Latvia Sri Lanka  
Congo, Rep. Lesotho St. Kitts and Nevis  
Costa Rica Liberia St. Lucia  
Cote d'Ivoire Lithuania St. Vincent and the Grenadines  
Croatia Luxembourg Sudan  
Cyprus Macedonia, FYR Swaziland  
Czech Republic Madagascar Sweden  
Denmark Malawi Switzerland  
Dominica Malaysia Syrian Arab Republic  
Dominican Republic Maldives Tajikistan  
Ecuador Mali Thailand  
Egypt, Arab Rep. Malta Togo  
El Salvador Mauritania Tonga  
Ethiopia Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago  
Fiji Mexico Tunisia  
 
 
